THE New Republic

Adlai In Wonderland

An Editorial

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DECEMBER 2, 1957

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Washington Wire

Can We Pull Ahead?

IN WORLD WAR I and World War II this reporter never had any doubt of ultimate American victory. Today we wonder. Without being melodramatic about it, the country seems in some danger.

Two weeks before Eisenhower flies to Paris to try to prop up NATO our allies show uncomfortable signs of neutralism. Would they be sitting ducks in a Soviet-USA intercontinental missile war played with H-bombs? Why should they take sides? It comes down to confidence. Can they trust the USA? The dislike left by McCarthyism runs deep. They distrust Dulles. (That's why the nervous Administration brought Stevenson in—Europe believes in him.) How about a nation so complacent that it lets Moscow get the jump on it in the space duel? (Two months after Sputnik we still lack a missile czar.)

Nor is this all. Our philosophy is built on an assumption of world power which we do not, in fact, possess. We still can't face the facts of life in China where our economic boycott rivets Chou's dependence on Moscow. In Germany we are committed to Dr. Adenauer and we treat his powerful opposition like pariahs. In the Middle East we postulate policy on total exclusion of Soviet influence though we have lost the ability to exclude it.

And so on. American foreign aid is limited or else Congress inserts damaging codicils like the ban on loans abroad to state-run industries. We should welcome Communist tourists and bring in every one we can get for they will become our allies, consciously or unconsciously, in the latent consumer revolt at home against Spartan austerity; instead of that we limit visitors jealously and drop our finger-printing only after it has given Moscow maximum propaganda advantage. We ban correspondents-exchange with China. So confident are we in our scientific superiority that we let a pigmy like AEC Chairman Strauss banish a giant like Oppenheimer. We let the business approach, symbolized by the Chamber of Commerce, keep our classrooms crowded and teachers underpaid while the Communists exalt their schools. Well, well. Put us down this week for a prophet of gloom and doom.

Why Does Nixon Do It?

WE STOPPED in at the old Mayflower Hotel grand ballroom last week to hear Nixon talk on foreign aid. They have regilded the place since the days when FDR used to speak there; the three crystal sunburst chandeliers are as brilliant as ever. Nixon has deliberately taken a difficult, uphill fight and he is giving it everything he's got. He is not floating with the current on this issue, he is breasting it at some probable cost (temporarily at least) to his GOP popularity.

This testimony for the Vice President is set down by one who is not, precisely, a Nixon admirer. We record that he was simple, relaxed, confident and persuasive and that he made what we consider a powerful speech. "If there is one lesson we must learn," he said, "it is that our purpose is not to buy friends. If we try that we are doomed to failure. Our interest is to see that every country is strong enough to be independent—including independence from the US. National independence is completely incompatible with the interests of Communism."

Why does Nixon stick his neck out like this? It is worth a little space to examine the subject. Few doubt his ambition or ruthlessness; it would be unwise to underestimate also his shrewdness and ability. He is now inside runner for the GOP nomination (somebody like Defense Secretary McElroy might of course displace him). Well, what will the public want of its president in 1960?

Why obviously, if world tension continues, it will want experience in international affairs. It is here that Mennen Williams of Michigan and Meyner of New Jersey (who are, we guess, the two leading Democratic hopefuls at present) are weakest. Nixon knows perfectly well the Bricker wing of the GOP can't nominate a candidate. He has boldly taken a course which, besides being sensible, in the long run should aid him.

Half a Welcome

IT IS HARD for a high-toned Administration like Eisenhower's to call in a former opponent like Adlai Stevenson and do it graciously. Good-nature and magnanimity are all right—but these Democrats! Truman had no trouble inviting Hoover back to the White House or recalling Major Eisenhower from Asia so that he could see his father sworn in; but after all Truman was only Truman.

Moral standards have been elevated since then. Cabinet meetings are introduced by prayer. The frosty White House has never called Truman back. It has been acutely embarrassing even with Adlai. Dulles needed his help but Hagerty, perhaps yielding to a Freudian wish, announced he wouldn't come. When this was cleared up it was found that the President himself hadn't been in touch with Stevenson; only when this appeared did Eisenhower write him a cordial personal note: he couldn't meet him at once, of course, but would later.

White House Secretary Sherm Adams helped smooth things over: he told a Chicago audience that Democrats are unreliable and that the Administration was asking in the opposition only because the public seemed to want it. He added, "I say nothing about the talents of the people being drafted."

Notes

THERE'S talk of a new coal-oil alliance to get the natural gas giveaway bill through Congress; the coal lobby would support it and the oil lobby in return would support a larger depletion allowance for coal—so far oil is the only industry to get the full 27.5 percent. . . . Presidential assistant Robert Cutler is generally blamed for Administration over-secrecy but Eisenhower has a military man's dislike of publicity too; between them facts which would have shown that the rosy defense picture was untrue never got published.

T.R.B.

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Correspondence

► *The Fund Raising Business*

SIRS:

REED WHITTEMORE is too charitable ("It May Be More Blessed, But," *NR*, Nov. 11).

I share his resentment at the prevailing acceptance of ends justifying means in the fund raising business. The good-works money-raiser, often now a profes-

(Continued on page 23)

Adlai's Mission

"Where do you come from?" said the Red Queen.
Alice explained that she had lost her way.
"I don't know what you mean by your way," said the Queen, "all the ways about here belong to me—but why did you come out here at all?" she added in a kinder tone. "Curtsy while you're thinking what to say. It saves time."

WE ARE WILLING to believe *both* that Adlai Stevenson is a man of good will who wants to help his country *and* that he is human enough not to mind seeing his name back in headlines. Hence speculation about why he consented to participate in the Eisenhower Administration's preparations for the forthcoming meeting of the NATO Council interests us less than why he was asked to, and what he is to do.

In general terms the answer to the first question isn't difficult. The New Look is bankrupt and the Democratic leader has been asked in to help save the enterprise from liquidation. It appears that he was offered originally something resembling a receivership, but such an arrangement is an impossibility under our system of four-year Presidential terms, as Mr. Stevenson properly pointed out when he said he could not assume responsibility for the President's foreign policy. But if he is not to be the receiver, controlling the assets and effecting reorganization, it is a good question what he *can* do.

Stevenson has been quoted by Marquis Childs as believing that "the meeting in Paris must transcend the current obsession of both Washington and London with missiles, rockets and weapons systems," because "the Soviets' real triumphs are in political and economic penetration." By implication he believes that the problem he has been called in to help solve is not a military problem. If he really believes this, he is gravely in error. Unpleasant though it may be, the military problem comes *first*, and it is in a fiasco of military policy that the bankruptcy lies. Until we put our strategic house in order, we are fighting the political and economic battles with our hands tied.

The national defense policy of the Administration has at least had the merit of simplicity. We had A- and H-bombs and our enemies in the Cold War didn't—or didn't have enough of them to stand up to us, or didn't have effective means of delivering those they had. Therefore to "deter" aggression, to prevent the Red Army from moving to the English Channel and, more to the political point, to prevent "another Korea," all that was required of us was a *convincing* declaration that we could and would "punish" the next aggression with our nuclear weapons. This is what the New Look amounted to, as the President recalled it for us in his first consoling speech on November 7—"depending for increased efficiency more upon modern science and less upon mere numbers of men." We were told at the time that it was going to save us money because a few A-bombs were worth thousands of men on the ground, hundreds of ships on the

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"How did you say their election came out?"

sea, or fleets of planes (other than bombers) in the air. We were not told that this pleasant situation was going to be a quite temporary one. Nor were we told, until just lately, that even the things we retained were going to continue so to increase in cost that we wouldn't actually *save* any money after all.

In order to make the declaration of our nuclear resolve convincing, the defense policy of the New Look has been highly vocal. When Mr. Stevenson complains about overemphasis upon the military aspect of foreign policy it is quite likely this that he has in mind. To persuade our challengers that we were determined to meet them with nuclear arms, regardless of the consequences and despite our reluctance to continue in our unique role as the only power ever to use nuclear weapons in war, and to persuade our friends that we were determined to defend them in this fashion, the government has spoken brazenly and frequently of the military miracles that we could accomplish—and would if put to it. In the same speech—post Sputniks I and II and with Russian ICBM's believed to be just around the corner—the President's speechwriters were still having him say that "one B-52 can carry as much destructive capacity as was delivered by all the bombers in all the years of World War II combined." But spine-chilling declarations of this sort have made it entirely too easy for the Russians to pose as champions of peace and humanity, and to convince many of the less informed peoples of the world that we are the militaristic "aggressors."

Moreover, it is possible that none of this vocalizing was necessary. The Russians and the Red Chinese knew what we had, and they were not going to commit suicide by offering us direct challenge. It is impossible to believe, in particular, that the Red Army was prevented from overrunning Western Europe by anything that Mr. Dulles *said*. Presumably what the Administration was really trying to do was to erase the impression (or the hope) that we might meet less direct aggression again, as we did in Korea, without using our nuclear power. But this assurance was aimed at least as much at our friends as at our enemies. It was intended to reassure the former that we could still guarantee their security while reducing our strength in conventional arms for the sake of economy. But when they saw us doing this in the midst of our unimagined prosperity, they understandably lacked enthusiasm for assuming larger defense burdens on their more modest resources.

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The New Look forced the Administration to devise new rationalizations for our continued military commitments to NATO. The North Atlantic Treaty, be it remembered, says nothing about nuclear defense, the US Strategic Air Command is not under NATO control, and the early plans definitely called for a *conventional* ground and air defense force in Western Europe. We heard of "trip wires" and "shields" to "trigger" SAC, or to hold off the oriental hordes until SAC could make its play. For such purposes it was obvious that a large conventional force was not required; it was also obvious to our Allies that the best way of guaranteeing that SAC would be sent on its way was to ensure that the force that had to be trampled by the aggressor was an American force.

But all this is now beside the point; the New Look is bankrupt—and why? Because the enemy is no longer a nuclear have-not. It is one thing to threaten an intruder with a gun when all he has is a club, even a very big club. It is quite another thing to threaten to shoot him when he can shoot back. You may still "deter" him, but the relation between you has become quite different. And the *first* impulse, at least, of any innocent bystanders will be to move out of the way.

Today nobody any longer believes that our *Soviet* opponent, at least, has only his conventional club to oppose to our nuclear gun. Our NATO allies are watching our every move, to see how we rise to the occasion and whether it is still safe for them to stick around. The ICBM and the IRBM, with the horrible prospect of "push-button" war, is the frosting on the cake. The destruction we have been threatening has become not just Russia's destruction but mutual destruction, and our European allies, the bystanders in this nuclear stand-off, are in our line of fire.

When Mr. Dulles says that our Allies need to be convinced that we will, in fact, use our nuclear power to

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defend them but not use it irresponsibly when not really necessary, he is describing this situation. He is talking about the third party standing between two opponents armed with guns and threatening to shoot each other at the first false move. Do we give the friendly bystanders guns of their own—even though we keep the ammunition in our pockets? Or do we just ignore the problem and talk about "political" solutions? It is this military problem that must be Mr. Stevenson's first concern. It is not just the question when we shall get operational IRBM's within range of Russian targets, nor how long before we shall be able to match Soviet power in ICBM's. Nor is it a question of the obsolescence of our bombers. It is a much more basic question. The enemy's big battalions are receiving nuclear weapons, on the ground, on the seas and in the air. There is no longer anything "new" about the New Look, nor any real validity left in it. But the Administration is incapable of looking this new problem in the face so long as it refuses to accept the bankruptcy of the New Look and to explore other possibilities. How can the Free World, in fact, defend itself against Communist single-mindedness of purpose now that it no longer has a nuclear advantage to give it prestige and guarantee its security?

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When we look at the political problems of the forthcoming NATO meeting in Paris, therefore, it is evident that this military problem is the crux. It isn't so much that our European allies want to dictate our actions in other parts of the world as that they are deeply concerned over the consequences of those actions *in Europe*. When we assert our unilateral right to use whatever force we consider necessary to defend our positions in the Far East, for example, and when we extend a nuclear guarantee of security to any minor power in the Middle East that asks for it, they consider that it is *their* survival that we have placed in question. Hence Mr. Dulles' dilemma: if he insists upon nuclear "deterrence" in every touchy situation that arises, he can expect to find European noses in what he regards as US business, but if he talks (as he has been doing lately) about possibly "limited" actions (and, Lord, save us, even conventional ones), he sees our European partners blanch before the threat of the "massive manpower of the Communist world" newly armed with "tactical nuclear weapons," and sees them on the point of scuttling into neutralism.

Mr. Dulles feels that there must be a solution for this dilemma within the confines of "massive retaliation" and the New Look—because if there is not he has been wrong somewhere along the line. But he no longer feels quite so sure of his own ability to persuade our European partners that a solution exists. The flat fact of the matter is that they have lost faith in Mr. Dulles, and he knows it. But they admire Adlai Stevenson and consider him an understanding friend. So it wasn't to be bipartisan that Mr. Dulles called in Mr. Stevenson. Nor was it to make constructive use of Mr. Stevenson's talents in matters of foreign policy. The Administration cannot really embrace bipartisanship without admitting the depth of the crisis and the bankruptcy of its cherished defense policy, and these things the President's speeches indicate that he is by no means prepared to do. And if you think that Mr. Dulles really wants *ideas* from Mr. Stevenson, just look at what he has been saying in speeches and press conferences to predetermine the US position at the Paris meeting even before Mr. Stevenson has had a chance to study the problems.

Much Ado about Zeus

THE *New York Times* would have us believe that there is another interservice squabble brewing. This time it is the anti-missile missile that is supposed to be the center of conflict. The Army has one, the Nike-Zeus, and the Air Force has one, called Wizard, but apparently the question at issue is not so much which one will be developed as to what extent and at what cost the development shall be pushed. According to Mr. Reston in an article that appeared on Nov. 20, the Army Chief of Staff is advocating a crash effort that might cost $6-7 billion over three years and will give us real security against the ICBM. The following day, Mr. Raymond, the *Times* Pentagon reporter, dutifully reported the Air Force violently opposed to any such irresponsible shenanigans. The best defense, says the Air Force, quoting military scripture, is a good offense, and if we spend all that money on a defense our offense is likely to be somewhat less than good.

In principle the anti-missile missile is simple. If you can build an ICBM, you should be able — technically speaking—to build its enemy the anti-ICBM or AICBM. It's rather like a batter facing the pitcher. He sees the ball leave the pitcher's hand and computes, more or less automatically, when to start his swing so that his bat and the ball will meet at the right spot. Simple. But most batters don't hit home runs.

Of course, in the world of missiles all the critical decisions must be made in advance, so that they can be applied instantaneously by electronic means at the required moment. And electronic wizardry can and does produce results that look miraculous. But there are electronic wizards on both sides; electronic gadgets, even the most expensive ones, sometimes break down; and you cannot deprive the designer of the attacking weapon of his priceless advantage, the initiative. Consequently, the defense must always be a gamble, and to be even reasonably reliable must be provided plentifully—say, in this case, perhaps five to ten anti-missile missiles for every ICBM the enemy may conceivably send in.

For these reasons there is a good deal to be said on the Air Force side, just this once. It would be most unfor-

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tunate, indeed tragic, if the public were given the impression that the AICBM is another "absolute weapon." The present distortion of our defense establishment would be even worse if transformed into a distortion on the side of the defense.

But this is not to say that the anti-missile missile should be neglected (which is probably not what the Air Force is suggesting anyway). There are substantial advantages to its development, geared in sensibly with development programs across a broad front. In the first place it is, of course, true that if either side could achieve a defense "perfect" in terms of a particular attacking weapon its opponent would be deprived of the value of that weapon. And we can never know just what is possible along these lines unless we try. But in addition, a defense of even marginal effectiveness—and the AICBM is likely to be much more than marginal in its ability to shoot down ICBM's—will greatly increase the effort the attacker is required to make before he can have confidence in the effectiveness of his attack. Thus what the USSR could be sure of doing to the US with only a hundred missiles or so if we had *no* defense, might well require thousands if we had a good anti-missile missile. This again is an end worth working towards. The AICBM is not likely to break the stalemate, but it may be an indispensable tool if we are to hold up our end *in* the stalemate.

Science for Export

In Syria and Egypt, Russian engineers recently turned up speaking fluent Arabic. It seems safe to assume that a Red engineer's need for Arabic to enhance his professional education is next to nil, and that the reason these engineers speak Arabic is because they were deliberately taught it in preparation for the day when they would be sent to an Arabic-speaking country.

This leads one to wonder how many Russian scientists, engineers and technicians speak Thai, Hindi, Spanish, Vietnamese or Bahasa Indonesian? (And how many American scientists, engineers and technicians speak any of these languages or Arabic?)

The answer in the first case is probably a considerable number, for the Soviets are preparing an army of scientists for export. This plan, long in the making, will be in a sense a new style colonialism, geared to the aim of scientific and technological world domination. Sputniks, muttnicks, moon rockets, atomic ice-breakers and giant atom-smashers will, of course, open the way to selling newly developing nations on the advantages of Russian scientific help. It is only logical that scientific have-not nations have begun to look upon Russia with new respect.

Exporting scientific manpower is comparatively easy for the Soviet Union, with its totalitarian state and tightly-managed educational system. Even if this were not the case, probably the army for export would still somehow be made available. The possible return from such an investment of manpower is too great for the Soviet leaders to let pass.

For when the Russians ship equipment and personnel to underdeveloped areas, they also ship a technological stranglehold. With Russian equipment and scientists comes the Russian language in the form of texts, manuals, specification sheets, and instructions. With it also comes dependence on Russian parts and Russian know-how. It is hard to imagine repairing a Russian-made atomic reactor using an American specification sheet. It is just as hard to conceive teaching a mechanic the workings or repair of a Russian jet engine with an English manual or a piece of hardware stamped made-in-USA. The recently-concluded $126 million Soviet loan agreement with India (to construct heavy machine-building plants) contained provisions for training Indian technicians in the Soviet Union. To aspiring young nuclear scientists in the newly developing nations the USSR recently offered 50 scholarships as part of its contribution to the new International Atomic Energy Agency.

How can the US, with its shortage of scientific manpower, afford to match the Russians in this Point-Four-type scientific aid?

It is highly improbable that we could convince American industry that it is as important to send young scientists abroad as it is to fill the home laboratories. Nor is there any guarantee that young scientists would want to go abroad at a time when they are riding high at home, chased after and bid for as fast as the ink is dry on their enrollment forms for freshman engineering.

But in spite of our strong distaste in the United States for ordering anyone to do anything, we have ways of inducing individuals to choose a given course. We have a history of government-financed education with post college obligations—the education offered at West Point, the Naval Academy, the NROTC program and the military flight-training programs. All are voluntary. All are free. All require that upon completion of schooling the volunteer must serve where he is told and do what he is told in the best interests of the nation.

Is it inconceivable for the Congress to establish a voluntary scholarship program for young scientists, with the government picking up the tab for the student's entire education in exchange for three or four years

NEXT WEEK

Lillian Smith on the silence of Southern moderates:

"I say the nation and the South have not heard white Southerners speak up against segregation in mass magazines and on the networks."

No Easy Way—Now

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service? Admittedly, young, inexperienced scientists might not make ideal emissaries for export. But they could free more mature scientists at home for work abroad. Without some such plan of action the Russians stand an excellent chance of winning the strategic manpower war by default.

What India Needs

INDIA'S request for a $600 million loan, which cannot be met without new Congressional appropriations, has become another casualty of politics-as-usual: Administration Alphonses wait for a "favorable climate" on Capitol Hill, while Congressional Gastons wish the White House would speak first. Only one Democratic Senator, Mike Mansfield, has to our knowledge publicly urged the Administration to introduce special loan legislation, and the GOP's leading Senate supporter of assistance to New Delhi, former Ambassador John Sherman Cooper, has avoided getting out in front of already-declared Administration policy. The result is that the Administration does not plan to go to Congress for an India loan—barring, of course, a Presidential change of heart—and India is likely to get at most one-third what it asked, some of this amount in forms it did not ask.

What India *did* ask for was an immediate line of credit of at least $600 million. But when Finance Minister T. T. Krishnamachari visited Washington in October, Secretary Dulles explained the perils of Congress and suggested that, since the US response to a formal request was so uncertain, it would be better not to make an explicit public request, letting the matter be handled behind the scenes. On the record, therefore, India has made its public requests for help in Nehru's, and Krishnamachari's, interviews with US correspondents rather than in any diplomatic note. There was not the slightest doubt in Washington or New Delhi, however, what Krishnamachari wanted, nor did he fail to "ask" Dulles and the President.

While the Administration's expected response is certainly better than nothing, it is not enough to begin to stabilize India's sagging Second Five Year Plan. Nor can it match Vice-President Nixon's brave words, repeated once again in his Philadelphia speech last week to the National Council of Catholic Youth, that missiles are no substitute for

> the economic, psychological and other forces which are necessary to keep free nations and so-called uncommitted nations from falling under the domination of the Communist powers.

In the absence of new loan appropriations, all that the Administration can do is piece together a patchwork: agricultural surpluses, credit from the new Development Loan Fund and from the World Bank and Export-Import Bank (which can extend a loan of any size without Congressional approval). Conceivably, the Loan Fund could, if given sufficient appropriations, provide substantial help, and so could the Export-Import Bank. But the Administration plans to ask for no more than the $625 million authorized by the last Congress for the Loan Fund—this must cover demands from all countries in the coming fiscal year—and the contemplated Export-Import loan, we are told, would not exceed $70 million. By all appearances the total US response to India will be at best $200 million in 1958.

The key to new funds from the World Bank (which has already loaned India $356 million) and the Export-Import Bank would be enactment of a plan proposed by Senator Cooper to convert India's 1951 wheat loan obligation ($190 million) to rupees. This is a constructive proposal which would greatly improve India's credit standing and presumably open the door to more foreign credit. Indeed, it would provide the opportunity for much more than a $70 million loan from the Export-Import Bank. Why does the Administration set its sights so low? Were they in any position to be choosers, Indian officials would not even choose the Export-Import Bank as a source of US funds: it loans dollars which must be used to purchase US goods—often at the highest prices in the world—cutting down, accordingly, the actual value of the loan and raising political as well as economic questions in New Delhi. The Indians have discovered, however, not only that they cannot be choosers, but that there is little to choose between in Washington today. The least that the Administration can do, we believe, if an Export-Import loan is to be a major channel for helping India, is to make this a loan sizable enough to overcome its political and economic limitations. In this instance, as we read the law, it is not necessary even to consult those fearsome Congressmen!

How Far Offshore?

ONE day we will be able to say that nothing in its judicial life so became the offshore oil controversy as the leaving of it. But the day is not yet. There has just taken place in the Supreme Court of the United States another, if in itself a minor, episode in the long and cheerless tale.

No calm observer can at any stage of the controversy have doubted that there is a major national interest in the exploitation of offshore oil reserves, an interest stemming from the federal government's exclusive responsibility for the conduct of foreign relations and the maintenance of military security.

Against wholesale abandonment of this national interest—the one step Congress could bring itself to take—stood the power and vigor of Harry S. Truman. Mr. Eisenhower characteristically pledged himself not to stand in the way, and after his election Congress acted. But still there was the question of how far out to sea the

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abandonment of the national interest should go. This question Congress begged. It ceded rights to each state up to its "historic boundary." Of course, historic boundaries at sea are not marked in neon lights in the Gulf of Mexico. It is unlikely that they can be intelligently determined without striking a balance—as of today—between what is required to safeguard the national interest and what may prudently be relegated to the States. And in any event, that balance is the decisive point, not the expectations, if any, of statesmen who negotiated the Louisiana Purchase or the accession of the Republic of Texas.

The question that Congress begged is now in the Supreme Court. It is to be said in behalf of the Administration—but not in behalf of Mr. Eisenhower himself, from whom little has been heard since his reckless pledges of 1952—that efforts were made to face Congress with its responsibility and get it to define a boundary limiting State authority. But to no avail. Hence one can scarcely blame the Solicitor General of the United States—whose client is the Nation—for invoking the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. The Court now has taken the initial step of getting the parties—Alabama, Florida, Louisiana, Mississippi, Texas—before it. There is a long litigating trail awinding. Once more the wrong question is being asked in the wrong place.

IMAGINARY CONVERSATION

Marcus Dullius *Caius Pinnius*

PINNIUS: That you have wronged France doth appear in this,
You have shipped arms to the Tunisians.

DULLIUS: Which you denied.

PINNIUS: Who says that I denied them?
I sought a pledge that they should not be passed to rebel forces in Algeria,
Nor increased by consignments from the East.

DULLIUS: Well? And Tunisia would have none of it.

PINNIUS: She must have yielded if you had not meddled
Behind my back.

DULLIUS: I gave you warning, Pinnius,
That I would send a token arms delivery.
You cannot say I went behind your back.

PINNIUS: I say you did. 'Twas an unfriendly act.

DULLIUS: Was it unfriendly to make Arab friends?
Unfriendly to forestall the Communists
And make Tunisia solid with the West?

PINNIUS: You tied my hands; you took me by surprise.

DULLIUS: I told you first. Let Britain be my witness.

PINNIUS: Yes, call in Britain who hath wronged me more,
Selwynius Lloydius perfidious,
Who leagued with France in Suez for his ends,
And for his ends now creeps into your favor.
What would this villain say, ye gods, if France
Sent arms to Greece which might go off in Cyprus?
Our entente now lacks cordiality.
By heaven, this British playing fast and loose
Shipwrecks Atlantic solidarity.

DULLIUS: Not we, but you endangered the alliance
By walking out of NATO in a huff.

PINNIUS: By all the gods, shall France be answerable
To NATO for conducting her affairs?
I'd rather be a dog and bay the moon
Than meekly take chastisement from that rabble.

DULLIUS: You make too much of this; pray you, be calm.

PINNIUS: France will protect her rights in Africa,
And not in words alone—so thwart not me.

DULLIUS: There is no terror, Pinnius, in your threats,
For they pass by me as the idle wind.
France can no longer win imperial wars.

PINNIUS: She could crush rebels, did you not betray me.

DULLIUS: What, I betray you? 'Faith, you cannot say so.
Your anger clouds your judgment; be advised
By cooler minds, more fit to make conclusions.

PINNIUS: Enough of windy words! Now answer this,
Stand you with France, or with her enemies?

DULLIUS: I stand by all. This is no time to quarrel,
But to engage in closer consultations
Between Tunisia and the Western Powers
Come, let me say that you and I agree
On the procedures of diplomacy.

PINNIUS: On the procedure, but not on the arms.

DULLIUS: Enough. Diplomacy can means invent
To smooth away this trifling incident.

PINNIUS: Go, launch your sputniks! Leave Algiers to me!

SAGITTARIUS

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Explosion Over Tunisia

Most of the Western press has treated the French explosion over Tunisia as an unfortunate accident which must not be allowed to distract NATO from its task of realizing "interdependence" at the Prime Ministers' meeting in Paris in December. In fact it should be regarded as a most valuable and timely warning of the pitfalls ahead. For it cuts to the root of many of the most dangerous problems which are likely to infest the next period in world politics.

In the first place, Tunisia shows that Britain and America have a conception of "interdependence" which is far removed from that of their major European allies. Because they both have global interests to protect, they insist on reconciling their policies in the NATO area with their policies in the Middle East and Asia. They cannot afford to forfeit all influence in the Arab world by conniving at French oppression of the Arabs in North Africa. For the British Government this is a deathbed conversion; the contrast between its position a year ago and today makes it all the less palatable to the French. The French still argue, as Britain did throughout the Suez dispute, that "interdependence" means NATO solidarity behind any ally who is in difficulties outside the NATO area. If they had their way, NATO would become the symbol, and indeed the instrument of Western resistance to the Afro-Asian revolution. Many Continental supporters of European federation have cherished a similar ideal—the creation of an Imperialist International.

There are signs that the Anglo-American decision on Tunisia was partly designed to deliver the *coup de grâce* to this type of thinking—to force the French to face the bankruptcy of their Algerian policy. For "interdependence" even in the military field means that the security of every member of the alliance will depend on the strength of its weakest link. Thus the alliance as a whole may be compelled to intervene even in the internal affairs of a member state, if the source of its weakness is a domestic one. The Algerian war is such an issue: it has already robbed NATO of France's military contribution and now threatens to plunge her into financial catastrophe. It is unthinkable that any country should make itself militarily dependent on France so long as the Algerian war continues.

But "interdependence" is a sham unless the dependence is genuinely mutual. The most unfortunate aspect of the Tunisian crisis is that it appears not only to France but to most of the Continental powers as an Anglo-American diktat. When the French delegates walked out of the NATO Parliamentary Conference in Paris the secretary of the German delegation said that the Federal Republic was entirely on the French side and opposed the British and American decision as "unilateral." The Greek and Dutch delegates took a similar line. This European solidarity against the Anglo-Saxons has a disturbing significance; it was inspired quite as much by current attempts to keep nuclear weapons an Anglo-American monopoly as by the Tunisian affair itself.

It is worth recalling that "interdependence" was the word chosen to describe the new status governing relations between France and Tunisia when the latter achieved self-government. Relations broke down when France refused to provide Tunisia with the weapons she judged necessary for self-defense unless Tunisia agreed that France should be permitted to supervise their use. The analogy with the present military negotiations inside NATO is suggestive. And unless the Anglo-Saxons treat their allies a good deal more generously than France has treated Tunisia, the time may come when one or the other of the Continental powers might turn elsewhere for the means to its security.

Nor is that the last trend of thought which the Tunisian affair should stimulate. As in the Middle East, so in Tunisia the American and British Governments are now competing with the Soviet Union in an arms export race which Russia is almost bound to win. Throughout the Arab world arms are a major threat to peace. Each of the Western governments is arming its own particular client in the knowledge that the arms are most likely to be used to damage the interests of its allies, or their clients. Yet so long as Russia is available as a source of arms, they dare not stop this race towards disaster—the most they can do is to try and impose conditions and restrictions on the use of arms. Russia can offer arms without conditions since her immediate aim is to upset the stability on which Western interests depend. The only way by which the West can break out of this vicious circle is by agreement with Russia on an international limitation and control of arms supplies. Yet the West treats repeated Russian offers to negotiate such a limitation simply as proof of an unwillingness to negotiate.

Tunisia is best regarded as a typical example of the problems which will confront the NATO Council next month on a far greater scale. Unless the allied governments first reach agreement on the basic issues which underlie the Tunisian crisis they would be wise not to commit themselves to any forms of cooperation which will make disagreement catastrophic when it comes.

Denis Healey

London

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A Catholic for President?

III. Public Office and Religious Affiliation

by HELEN HILL MILLER

MANY MEMBERS of the Catholic hierarchy are said to be concerned at the possibility of a Catholic becoming a Presidential candidate in 1960, on the ground that in a period of propaganda through mass media, at a time when regional passion with regard to one of the other traditional American minorities is newly inflamed, recent Catholic gains in community acceptance and absorption into the American scene might suffer a setback.

Catholic politicians, by contrast, and party managers generally feel no such inhibitions; they are looking around. In 1960 their minds will be made up, after careful canvass of alternative possibilities and much doodling with statistics of key states, strictly on the basis of who they think is most likely to win. Many of them believe that religious antagonisms are on the wane. They subscribe to an answer recently given by Sen. John Kennedy (D, Mass.) when a newspaperwoman representing Southern papers asked him if he regarded his religion as a political handicap. He pointed out that in two widely-separated states where Jewish populations are small, a Jew has recently been elected to high office—Sen. Richard Neuberger in Oregon and Governor Abraham Ribicoff in Connecticut.

But if religious affiliation nevertheless remains a factor worth considering—and few disclaim the influence in American politics of Francis Cardinal Spellman—the most recent state figures on religious affiliation, compiled from the official records of the various church bodies by the National Council of Churches, give forecasters the statistics to work on.

This far ahead of the election, a Protestant voter who is asked whether he would support a Catholic nominee usually bases his answer on his belief in respect to this question: Can a Catholic in public office separate himself from control by his church?

The issue was clearly stated at the Senate Judiciary Committee's hearings this last February when William Joseph Brennan, Jr. of New Jersey, a Catholic, was nominated to be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States. Sen. Joseph O'Mahoney (D.) of Wyoming announced that, particularly because he is himself a Catholic, he desired to put to Mr. Brennan in open hearing a question brought forward in executive session by Mr. Charles Smith, representing the National Liberal League, an organization Smith described as "devoted to the cause of separation of church and state."

This was the question Mr. Smith requested to have asked:

> You are bound by your religion to follow the pronouncements of the Pope on all matters of faith and morals and also matters of law and justice. But in matters of law and justice, you are bound by your oath to follow not papal decrees and doctrines, but the laws and precedents of this nation. If you should be faced with a mixed issue, would you be able to follow the requirements of your oath or would you be bound by your religious obligations?

This was Mr. Justice Brennan's reply:

> Senator, I think the oath that I took is the same one that you and all of the Congress, every member of the executive department up and down all levels of government take to support the Constitution and laws of the United States. I took that oath just as unreservedly as I know you did, and every member and everyone else of our faith in whatever office elected or appointive he may hold. And I say not that I recognize that there is any obligation superior to that, rather that there isn't any obligation of our faith superior to that. And my answer to the question is categorically that in everything I have ever done, in every office I have held in my life or that I shall ever do in the future, what shall control me is the oath that I took to support the Constitution and laws of the United States and so act upon the cases that come before me for decision that it is that oath and that alone which governs.

However politically tactful this statement may have been, it is doubtful whether the Catholic Church could accept it as representative of Catholic doctrine. Protestants too, or indeed Americans with religious affiliation

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outside the Christian faith, might equally question a primacy of the state as complete as Mr. Justice Brennan implied in his answer. The Catholic religious philosopher Jacques Maritain's *Man and the State* contains a pertinent commentary that could find acceptance in wider circles:

> The common good of civil life is an ultimate end, but an ultimate end in a relative sense and in a certain order, not the absolute ultimate end. This common good is lost if it is closed in upon itself, for, of its very nature, it is intended to foster the highest ends of the human person. The vocation of human personality to goods which transcend the political common good is embodied in the essence of the political common good. To ignore these truths is to sin alike against both the human person and the political common good. Thus, even in the natural order, the common good of the body politic implies an intrinsic though indirect ordination to something which transcends it. . . . Thus the indirect subordination of the body politic—not as a mere means, but as an end within itself yet of lesser dignity—to the supra-temporal values to which human life is appendant, refers first and foremost in point of fact, to the supra-natural end to which the human person is directly ordained. To sum it up all in one word, the law we have before us is the law of the *primacy of the spiritual.*

Catholic and Protestant alike might find accord in foreseeing certain situations in which a public official, faced with a clear duty under a law of the state, might resign rather than execute it, and in doing so echo the words of Martin Luther, "It is neither safe nor prudent to do aught against conscience. Here stand I—I cannot do otherwise. God help me. Amen."

Actually, in the relationship of the citizen to his state and his church, while the Catholic's dilemma has an additional dimension beyond that of the Protestant, it is not unique.

Practically every man or woman in politics acknowledges some religious affiliation—in a recent survey of the current Congress, out of 435 members of the House and 96 members of the Senate, only four indicated none. Some Protestant officials in Washington have been or now are prominently church-connected—Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, a Presbyterian, has served the Federal Council of Churches as chairman of its Commission on a Just and Durable Peace; Brooks Hays of Arkansas, the recent intermediary between Governor Faubus and the White House, is the present president of the Southern Baptist Association. Former Senator Herbert Lehman is outstanding in Jewish activities. These men too are under pressure on certain issues from the religious groups to which they belong: Dulles would hear from his co-religionists if the issue of an ambassador to the Vatican were to be revived; Hays could hardly associate himself with action favorable to the liquor industry; Lehman is unlikely to reverse his attitude on Israel.

Kennedy

Gruenther

Normally, however, the people from whom such men would hear would be fellow-laymen of their denominations. By and large, Protestants have been dubious of participation in politics by the churches as such; ministers who have taken conspicuous specific stands as some have done, from Bishop Cannon in the 1920's to A. Powell Davies in our own time, have usually, though not always, done so as individuals.

(A sample Gallup Poll of American adults, whose results were announced April 17, 1957, showed a fairly even division in reply to the question: Should the churches keep out of political matters—or should they express their views on day-to-day social and political questions? Of the respondents, 47 percent thought they should express their views; 44 percent thought not; 9 percent were without opinion.)

And this major difference distinguishes the Protestant bodies from the Catholic church. In many of the former —Presbyterians, Baptists, Churches of Christ—the officers who constitute the administrative body of the church and the ministers are chosen by, and hence depend for tenure on, the laity. Even among denominations with an hierarchic structure, such as the Episcopalians and the Methodists, while the bishops can guide their flocks, and can, for certain causes, exclude erring members from communion, there is no area in which they have an absolute power to direct them.

The sanctions of Protestantism accept the final validity of individual judgment and conscience, whereas in the words of James Cardinal Gibbons, "While you [Protestants] believe in private judgment, we [Catholics] believe in a religion of authority which our conscience tells us is our lawful guide and teacher in its own sphere."

At the moment, this difference of belief as to the ultimate authority determining conduct looms large in the reaction of voters questioned as to their attitude—pro or con—toward a Catholic nominee in the 1960 Presidential race.

As time goes on, however, its relative importance will doubtless lessen. Just as, in 1928, a cluster of issues quite unrelated to his Catholicism surrounded Al Smith's

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candidacy, the approach of the forthcoming period of active candidacies will see a comparable—though different and contemporary—cluster forming around any Catholic who may be mentioned for 1960.

For example, at present, the 55,345 miles of travel (up to the end of October) which General Alfred Gruenther has put in on behalf of the American Red Cross since becoming its director last January, have won him many local friendships, alike among stricken families in disaster areas or in the more relaxed atmosphere of state chapter board rooms. But if the trial balloons that are periodically sent up with his name on them should begin to acquire real visibility, that name would begin to be surrounded by issues. Among them his Catholicism might be one, but it would promptly have to move over and make room for at least one other—his military background. The Red Cross proved an adequate demilitarizing agency for the transition of General George Marshall from a five-starred uniform in the Pentagon to a business-suited post in the Cabinet, but there is a tradition in this country against too frequent use of the White House as the home of the well-known soldier.

Similarly, if Senator Kennedy remains a front-runner among Democrats, his actions will be increasingly scrutinized to see if his profile displays courage as well as glamor.

So, if nomination of a Catholic should become an actual fact, historians of the campaign of 1960 will doubtless have as much difficulty disentangling the reasons for what happens to him, and the extent that religion played a part in the result, as they did after November, 1928, brought defeat to the Happy Warrior.

This concludes a series of three articles.

America as a World Power

by MAX LERNER

If America were Rome, who would be the barbarians? From America's standpoint, they would have to be the hordes of Communism, with the Russians and the Chinese as the leading tribes. The weakness in this analogy is immediately apparent. The Russians, with their tight statism, their rigid doctrinal unity, their ideological obsessiveness, their social conformism, are far from the image of amorphous barbarian bands pushing against the tottering ramparts of the empire. As for the Chinese, they combine the new steel frame of Communist doctrine with a civilization older even than that of the Russians, which in turn is older than the American, and with a highly complex structure of society and an ancient heritage of art and learning.

It is ironic for Americans to search for a "barbarian" image when they have themselves long embodied that image for Europe. Take almost any commentary on America written in the past half century by almost any culturally self-conscious European—let us say George Duhamel's *Scenes de la vie future*—and you will find in it the overpowering image of barbarians with machines coming to invade the empire of the spirit and preparing to lay waste to the ancient structures of sensibility and personality. There is also a second sense in which the concept of barbarians may be used. Spengler premised a phase of history in which politics and the state had broken down into a formless pursuit of individual greeds. He saw America as a random collection of people drifting from city to city in pursuit of the dollar, incapable of understanding politics in the Spenglerian sense of the arts of disciplined mastery. But Spengler also saw Bolshevik Russia as the same kind of barbarian horde that had "ceased to be a state," its economic man dominant over the political man, its political outlook lacking the dimension of depth. Unfortunately such a definition of the barbarian would include most of the economically developed peoples of the world, leaving only the Caesarist regimes of Fascism to sustain the idea of civilization.

The West European and the uncommitted Asiatic might regard America and Russia as expressing only alternative modes of barbarism. In both there is the abundance of energy that threatens to overwhelm the mellower or more passive civilizations, in both a high degree of organizing genius as the "practical" men seek an engineering approach through the state trusts of the commissars or the corporate trusts of capitalist Big Management. Given the polarizing pressures of the two superpowers, a large part of the world has begun to offer a growing resistance to the "either/or" choice between the two Romes. The struggle is not between a world empire and a number of barbarian outposts but between two great powers who are competing for world power while each insists it desires only its national security, and much of the rest of the world refuses to accept the terms

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of the struggle or to enroll as a conscript in either army.

One aspect of the struggle is the rivalry between America and Russia for the pacifying and organizing role that Rome played in the late Republic and early Empire. The period of the *pax Romana* was one of relative peace and prosperity not only in Rome but the provinces. There are few periods in world history when, over so wide an expanse, men could go about their business, arts and pleasures in so undisturbed a way. The real disaster came out of the resulting rigidity and stagnation. Like the Americans and the Russians, the Romans were highly "practical" men who valued things more than they valued ideas: they perished by a failure of the imagination. A single world empire provides no rivalries of power and of values. Rome could destroy Carthage, but it could not overcome its own institutions of privilege and slavery which sapped its productive force and stripped its technology of dignity. It glorified the martial virtues but had not inner strength to give them meaning. When the challenge of the barbarians finally came, Rome had to pay Danegeld to buy off the marauders. The disease of war put the finishing touches to what had been left by the disease of class and underlying both was the disease of social uncreativeness.

What are these two civilizations, each of which is exerting its claim to organize the future by its own *pax Romana?* Their struggle for world influence is not an overnight phenomenon. De Tocqueville wrote of them:

> There are at the present time two great nations in the world which seem to tend toward the same end, although they started from different points; I allude to the Russians and the Americans. Both of them have grown up unnoticed; and while the attention of mankind was directed elsewhere they have suddenly assumed a prominent place among the nations; and the world learned their existence and their greatness at almost the same time. All other nations seem to have nearly reached their natural limits . . . but these are still in the act of growth; all others are stopped, or continue to advance with extreme difficulty; these are proceeding with ease and celerity along a path to which the human eye can assign no term. The American struggles against the natural obstacles which oppose him; the adversaries of the Russian are men; the former combats the wilderness and savage life; the latter, civilization with all its weapons and its arts; the conquests of the one are therefore gained by the plowshare; those of the other by the sword. The Anglo-American relies upon personal interest to accomplish his ends, and gives free scope to the unguided exertions and common sense of the citizens; the Russian centers all the authority of society in a single arm: the principal instrument of the former is freedom; of the latter servitude. Their starting point is different, and their courses are not the same; yet each of them seems to be marked out by the will of Heaven to sway the destinies of half the globe.

It took a remarkable insight to discern the destinies of Russia and America at a time when Russia was still a pre-industrial despotic monarchy and America, just beginning to look across the Mississippi, was still a small agrarian society and had only just proclaimed the Monroe Doctrine. But De Tocqueville sensed that there were common elements in these two societies and comparable resources for them to develop, which would one day make them the polarizing forces of the world. Each had a massive continental stretch that could be exploited as a base for empire. In the history of each the plain left its influence on the people, as Turner saw for America and Sir John Maynard for Russia. Each has shown an organizing capacity and a skill in amassing power. Most of all, both have shown the capacity (which stamps a strong civilization) to release locked-up energies.

THE Russia which De Tocqueville saw was Czarist and not Communist, so that he could not have foreseen the extent to which the Communist idea would become first a religious creed for the Russians and then a state church in which the religious fire had begun to burn out. His eye was, then, not on the dogma but on the land and the people. In them lay the capacity to give this or any other dogma its strength. In the American case, on the other hand, he noted the principle of freedom that has persisted to this day—a principle available for others as well as for Americans to develop. Thus what counted again was the land and the people, in whom lay the capacity to give the democratic idea its own brand of strength. What was latent in both cultures in 1835 has been realized in the mid-Twentieth Century. Every people has its high historical moments, when it feels a triumphant sense of national energy. What marks both the Russians and the Americans is that they moved beyond these short-lived spurts of intensity in a continuing arc of energy that they are still sustaining. This may be only a more complex way of putting what De Tocqueville calls "the will of Heaven" in explaining how each has come "to sway the destinies of half the globe."

The fact that America and Russia, who are today such determined rivals and whose social systems and principles are so at variance, should share certain common traits is a fact to infuriate as well as astonish the unthinking partisans of both. Yet reflection will show that there must be common elements which have led these two civilizations to steady growth and world power. These elements are not such as can be isolated by scientists and by their rigors of scientific method. Since they have to do with the intangibles of social energy and national character, they yield more readily to the intellectual imagination. I have mentioned the prophetic insight of De Tocqueville. Curiously, Walt Whitman, poet rather than political theorist, expressed a similar insight in his famous *Letter to Russia*:

> You Russians and we Americans! Our countries so distant, so unlike at first glance—such a difference in

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> social and political conditions, and our respective methods of moral and practical development . . . and yet in certain features, and vastest ones, so resembling each other. The variety of stock elements and tongues, to be resolutely fused in a common identity and union at all hazards—the idea . . . that they both have their historic and divine mission—the fervent element of manly friendship throughout the whole people, surpass'd by no other races—the grand expanse of territorial limits and boundaries—the unform'd and nebulous state of many things, not yet permanently settled, but agreed on all hands to be the preparations of an infinitely greater future—the fact that both Peoples have their independent and leading positions to hold, keep, and . . . fight for . . . the deathless aspirations at the inmost center of each great community . . . are certainly features you Russians and we Americans possess in common.

I do not cite these common traits to argue that there are no grounds for world struggle between Russia and America. The comparable historical elements in each system may be partly what has set them in opposition to each other. Neither in the life of nations nor of individuals do somewhat parallel personality structures insure the absence of conflict. The fact is that Russia and America are also strongly unlike each other, which implies not only a basis of conflict but means that each may at some future time manage to fit into a world culture which must feed on diversities.

THE crucial difference does not lie in ideologies alone, important as they are: for the hold that Communism as an ideology has on the Russians and capitalist democracy on the Americans is something that itself needs explaining. The clues are in history and national character. Russia's long history of the oppression of peasants and the muzzling of intellectuals, along with psychological factors in the life history of the individual which await closer study, provided a strain of alternating violence and submission to authority. Children of an authoritarian church and a feudal social organization, the Russians never developed free institutions. They are burdened with the oppressive weight of dynastic history, and the experience of the Communist rulers did not abolish the dynastic pattern but left it intact. It is, moreover, a history marked by a succession of sharp breaks and catastrophes. The Kiev period was followed by a shift in trade routes, the weakening of Russian economic power, and by a Tartar rule which proved to be a long history of foreign enslavement. The Moscow period was one of domestic tyranny. Then came the rule of Peter and the awakening of Russian energies from their long Asiatic sleep—the fusion of Western and Eastern elements which evoked much of Russia's later strength. The witless misrule and corruption under the later Czars led to the double disaster of the defeat by Japan and the abortive 1905 revolution. Thus the 1917 break with the *ancien regime* was part of a continuing history of breaks and new starts which conditioned the Russian people to a long patience amidst a turbulent sequence of social disturbance and violent change.

One of the deepest differences between the two cultures lies in their divergent views of human nature and history. There is a messianic strain in the Russian tradition to which the American character is less conditioned, except for the influence of Biblical sin and salvation in the 19th Century Communist settlements and millennial movements. Students of Russian religion have noted that its core idea has been not the individual's responsibility to his conscience but the mystical sense of the congregation as a whole. To the Russian mind, therefore, both truth and salvation are likely to lie less in the individual soul than in the collective. The 1917 Revolution gave an explosive force to the Russian mystical and messianic strain, but it added also something the Russian thinkers from Belinski to Trotsky did not foresee—the will of a disciplined party seeking to transform the society according to a dogmatic scheme. Thus the Communist era imposed upon the *mystique* of the traditional Russia a rigid frame of planning based on a wholly rationalist view of human nature.

At first sight these may seem drastically opposed, leading to the conclusion that the Communist regime, with its optimistic assurance that Russia and the world can be transformed according to a plan, could not thrive in a people with strong mystical and pessimistic strains. But this is to forget the common elements in past and present: the indifference toward individual values in the pursuit of some larger collective aim, whether it be the Holy Spirit-in-the-congregation, Socialism-in-one-country, or the triumph-of-the-world proletariat. Linked with the Byzantine rather than the Western phase of European history, the Russians skipped both the Renaissance and the Reformation—which is to say that they skipped both humanism and the individual conscience. Toynbee has pointed out the inner link between what he calls "archism" and "futurism." The former, as in the case of the Russian church, the peasant community, and the Slavophile movement, seeks to revive ancient forms for new situations; the latter, as in the case of Communism, seeks a short cut into the future. Both are examples of a mechanical Utopianism. Swinging from one to the other, the Russians have managed to stay within the same metaphysical frame.

Another difference lies in the pace of industrial growth. In a collectively willed process of industrialization the same act of planning which creates the economic structure creates also its political counterpart in the party and the state. Thus, the willed elements become central, and by a trial-and-error process of shifting party-line policies the effort is made to fit into the same pattern the strands of war and peace, industry and agriculture, education, family life, art and philosophy. By comparison

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the process of industrialization in America and indeed the whole historic growth of the culture appear almost haphazard, a product of organic unfolding rather than of collective will. Where the whole growth has been so continuous, there is no need for drastic transformations by violence. Where individual career and conscience have counted for so much, there is strong resistance to the short cuts which would by-pass both.

It is here that the strength of America's destiny lies. To be sure, a Communist system can drive ahead with a single-minded purpose and can make and consolidate gains with a swiftness denied to the more organic civilization like the American, which must feel out all the surrounding pressures in the very act of driving ahead. Yet the more tentative process of change has the merit of being more deeply rooted in the consent and energies of a people which feels itself part of what it has shaped freely out of its own process of growth.

Seeking to pierce the obscurity of the future, one may ask what will be the destiny of these two civilizations. There is one sense in which the two destinies are linked. It is impossible for each of them to establish its own pacifying and organizing force over the world which will parallel the *pax Romana*. On the other hand, if each pushes its claims and fears to their ultimate logic, the collision will be disastrous for both. An effort to divide the world between them seems futile, since such division could hold good only between two friendly powers, and even then any rigid formula imposed on the world would be bound to break before the currents of change.

If the struggle is fought out to the end, with nuclear weapons and germ warfare, the only prospect is a large measure of world suicide. If this is avoided, and the divergent social systems of the world manage to live side by side, the question arises whether there will be an inner collapse within one of the two great power structures, leading to a victory for the other without war. Here too America has the advantage. Since it uses the method of freedom and has established an unquestioned machinery for the succession of power, it does not run the risk Russia and China run of having the regime fall in the struggle over the succession. The old fears of internal collapse through economic breakdown have proved exaggerated, nor is there any institutional issue like slavery which might lead again to a bitter Civil War. Nor, despite the methods of Communist penetration, is there any great danger of an overthrow of the government from within. The greatest civil danger is that of the growth of an adventurist nationalist movement which would create a police state under the guise of saving the country from totalitarianism and would ally itself with the military elite. But if this were ever to happen it would be only as a consequence of a world atomic war or as prelude to it: America has shown the capacity to survive this kind of crisis short of a nuclear war.

The chances of civil struggle within the Communist systems and their satellites are greater. Once it loses the mastery of the coercive machinery of the state, a police regime must pay the price of inner strains and doubts. The suppression of competing opinion means that every leader or movement which might otherwise be a rival of the Administration becomes an enemy of the state itself. The method of Communism, as Albert Camus pointed out, divides the community into executioners and victims—and, one may add, the politically inert who are content to accept the rule of those on top. But while a one-party state and an iron party discipline are easy ways of eliminating inconvenient dissent and establishing party truth in science and human affairs, they cannot eliminate hunger as a spur to revolt, nor praetorian conflict, nor the survival of nationalist impulses in the satellite countries. The satellites are thus always ready to use the outbreak of war as an occasion for breaking away from the Communist imperium.

ALONG with the danger of suicidal destruction, this adds another argument against world war which may be persuasive to the Soviet mind. The alternative for both civilizations is not merely "co-existence" but co-rivalry in the struggle of ideas. One finds an interesting parallel in the era of European religious wars at the time of the Reformation and counter-Reformation. If both the Protestants and Catholics had been set on establishing a universal church, and if each had controlled a segment of state power, war would have been unceasing until one or the other had been wiped out. But there was a growth of secular authorities for whom peace and national unity were more urgent than the defense of the True Faith. The religious conflict was neither forgotten nor abolished, but it was transformed into a proselytizing rivalry within the frame of a secular authority—a rivalry that was only sporadically bloody but mainly peaceful. In this co-rivalry Americans have the advantage of presenting to the world a political and social system which will furnish a better and freer life for the large mass of people than its rival. Yet the struggle is bound to be a bitter one. It is not too hard, however, to conceive of an international secular authority which will similarly keep the struggle of the new political religion from engulfing the world in war and hold it within the frame of non-military rivalry.

In such an event America's destiny in the calculable future will be to take a hand in creating this constitutional frame while it seeks to build friendly coalitions within it and help other peoples to reach in their own way their own institutions and method of freedom. This will mean a peaceful but exacting rivalry in which America will be one of a number of spokesmen for an open society, using with greater or lesser skill its statecraft and diplomacy, its technical and economic resources and its whole armory of ideas.

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BOOKS & COMMENT

How the Other Side Lives

by Reuel Denney

IT IS too bad that many Americans who have read one or another of the works of England's angry young men will probably never read this study of England's majority. It is not merely a picture of the English working class and its daily life and amusements today. It is in some senses the intellectual autobiography, between-the-lines, of a man born to the working class who left it by the scholarship route. Despite its references to the between-worlds insecurity of many such scholarship boys, it is written with a kind of matter-of-fact graciousness that is admirable. The root of that graciousness is found in the author's warm but objective attachment to a class life he has in many respects left behind him.

The Uses of Literacy: Changing Patterns in British Mass Culture, by Richard Hoggart (Essential Books; $5).

Another reason for his detached yet feeling viewpoint is to be found in the organization of the book. It is a study of the relation between the temperament of a social class and the mass media it consumes. Because it is written in an admirable non-technical style it almost conceals the fact that it represents the bringing together of many solid data, from many research sources, in an offhandedly dependable way. Fitted into the picture are the results of such researches as the Hulton Readership Survey, and inquiries into organization of football-betting pools. None of this research is allowed to swamp the reader with its impersonality as data, its pomposity as "social fact" or its possibilities for moralizing. The result of the research is simply transmitted to the reader, in its proper context, at the right time, and in a warm and lucid expositional style.

As research, and as report on research, Hoggart's book shows that the mood of the British working class continues to be one of composed disappointments in its way of life. It shows also that the chief defense pattern of the working class against this definition of reality is an insistence on what this book calls the "cheery tone." The mass media are expected to distribute this cheery tone, with some variations, to a family and neighborhood culture that cultivates the same tone in its daily round of life. Things are tough. They probably will continue to be. Extremes of social mood, ranging from social resentment on the one extreme to social self-pity on the other, are not productive. They are more likely to lead individuals and groups into disorder than into fulfillment. They had better be policed out of the atmosphere in which the working-class child is brought up.

In observing what remains more or less changeless in British working-class culture, the author observes what has changed. In one place he reports that the consumption of liquor has decreased sharply since Victorian times. In another he notes that the household consumption of coal has gone up. One might take the two facts together and see them as a pattern of change in the sources of warmth, of feelings of security, and of social organization, in the daily life of working-class men. The working-class man has become much more like the middle-class man. In the course of doing so, he has participated in a stabilization of his family life.

HOGGART, however, does not draw a social moral in quite this way. He is interested in the battles yet to be won. What can the working-class man or woman *really* do with his more comfortable but still constricted round of life? In the past, honest working men often lived a life of extreme poverty, nerved by a gift of self-reliance and a talent for "making things do," to maintain appearances. Today, they can all look conventionally respectable and dowdy in ready-made clothes; all their wives can go to the movies once in a while; all their children can get a little schooling — and none of their old strength under pressure of failure is in much demand.

I read Hoggart as saying that as more and more of the tender toughness in British working-class life is modulated into comfortable sentimentality the class begins to lack productive challenge. It is not yet especially aware of this itself. It is able to vary its diet of British cheeriness and bawdy British realism only by taking larger and larger doses of Americanism. These doses appear in force, at first, in the styles of the mass media. They are connected, in the long run, with slowly-changing attitudes toward credit-buying, relations between men and women, relations between parent and child, and with images of the whole social order. While culturally tolerant of American mass media output, Hoggart is not sure that it adds much to the English working-class scene. The nearest he comes to theorizing about it is to suggest most American genres such as the hard-boiled detective story lose both their meaning and their form when imitated in England.

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someone who prefers to organize social perceptions graphically rather than to theorize about them. A firm, almost mystical belief in the inner life of the individual, forms the base of a sensibility that can report so well. As in most British writing on social organization, this virtue has its costs. The writer's own sense of an internal life is projected on the individuals he is writing about as if it were a natural part of their constitution. When he sees change taking place, his major concern is whether this inner life, with its historic stake in freedom, will be lost. This fear, based on these assumptions, is almost everywhere present in current British writing on social organization. Nowhere is it provided with much footing. Hoggart's book, like much of the daily reportage of the more serious British press, is the product of a nation that prefers to think that a discipline such as social psychology does not exist.

To put it briefly, Hoggart's data tend to show, and he quite definitely argues, that self-identification in the British working class has changed. He then goes on to suggest that in the new situation, a certain sense of individual freedom, inner freedom, may be lost, because people themselves have lost their sense of it.

In this evaluation of his finding, he leaves most of the main variables undefined. What *was* the older sense of individual freedom? With what social roles was it associated? From what aspects of the class culture was it constituted? What was its connection with the individual's or the family's mobility? On what basic social personality type in Britain did it constitute a class variant? With what social character type was it allied? With what model personality types? At least some such theoretical framework, constituting something like a "social psychology" is indispensable in evaluating Hoggart's data. It is not surprising, while British verbal philosophers try to solve problems in psychology by philosophical method, that Hoggart should have to go unarmed with these theoretical tools. The intellectual price of a warm precision in British writing about social groups is a deep hatred of theory. Hoggart has done very well in spite of all that.

Throttling the Voice of Passion

by Leon Edel

A GIVEN LIFE, even that of a poet, doubtless must be assembled and written dispassionately and even "scientifically," but seldom has the very voice of passion been cushioned with dispassion as in this book. The biographer's risk is that of achieving only a diagram of poetic emotion, an echo of the intensities that burned long ago. What saves this life from being a catalogue of data is the vibrancy of the Byronic temperament which still lingers in the long-ago letters and memories, and pours blood into the inanimate page.

Byron, a biography by Leslie A. Marchand (Knopf; three volumes, $20).

Byron was the very voice of Romanticism, brooding upon itself in dark, Olympian melancholy. May we not discern remnants of it in our own unromantic age? Saint-Exupery was a kind of winged Byron. Some of Hemingway's heroics, gin-bottle and all, in Spain and on the periphery of Paris at the liberation, showed a real affinity with Byron's quest for the grandeur of action. We might see also in the mediative Childe Harold or in Manfred a little of Existential man who seeks a *modus vivendi* with the indignity of a human condition driven within its eternal orbit of death. Existential man, however, is intellectual and philosophical; he is a projection of rational man. Byron was all action and passion.

The boy Byron was the spoiled, abused darling of a tempestuous mother; she smothered her son with kisses but was capable of kicking him in the next moment with equal intensity. A servant initiated him at nine into some of the mysteries of sex so that he felt later that he "had anticipated life." Love, affection, passion, became mixtures of delight and pain, tempest and calm. Small wonder that Byron's relations with women

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

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blew hot and cold, and that he found certain men more congenial and could even love them with a "purer" passion. He could be attracted and repelled by the mercurial and eccentric Caroline Lamb; she was as unpredictable as his mother.

Otherwise there was solace either with common Venetian women, who accepted him for his beauty with animal delight; or with aristocratic women who possessed the benign side of his mother, above all with his half-sister Augusta Leigh, who rang in what we might call an Oedipal variant for Byron. Finally, in the long gallery of passion and disaster, there was Teresa Guiccioli, who constituted Byron's "last attachment" and provided a certain protective comfort. Byron's strange marriage to the bluestocking, Annabella Milbanke, can be partially explained as intellectual conformity and a piece of cold opportunitism indulged in by a non-conformist. It had no relation to feeling. And since Byron was a man of feeling, this amounted to a denial of self. It comes as no surprise that from the first he should have behaved as one performing a distasteful duty.

THE CENTRAL and pathetic irony of his life—surely one of the most dramatic ever lived by a poet—was that of Byron's physical plight. To be a peer, the mold of form and the glass of fashion of his time, to have the accent of passion so that women besieged him, and with this to carry about a club foot, was a supreme and mocking indignity. Stendhal, with his novelist's pen, wrote a poignant sentence after seeing Byron in Milan. "Byron arrived late," wrote Stendhal, "and he was obliged to cross a spacious saloon in which every eye was fixed on him and his club foot." To be powerful—and maimed: to tower above men—and to limp behind them! The poet's wound was not something to be nursed within; it was exposed to the whole world. One understands readily Byron's need for a life of excess; even the swimming of the Hellespont did not suffice. He had to prove himself every minute of his life. "I want a hero," he announced in the opening line of *Don Juan*. He could never be heroic enough to satisfy himself.

Byron, pursuing his ideals and gratifying his sensual pleasures by a process of surfeit, was distinctly aware that life, not literature, was his vocation. Poetry was for him a way of blowing off steam, ridding himself of tension engendered by excess and not always gratified by it. He recognized this in a shrewd insight when he said that poetry was "the lava of the imagination whose eruption prevents an earthquake." This suggests to us the explosive quality of Byron's feelings. It points, moreover, to the second-rate in his poetry, or, as Yeats expressed it, "a first-rate man, who was somehow not first-rate when he wrote." Byron was a witty rapid improviser and the least impersonal of poets. Poetry was made an integral part of his daily experience, and the most serious reproach to be addressed against this book is that it leaves out virtually all consideration of the poetry. There is no attempt to assess the work, *to consider it as art, to arrive at a critical* estimate of it. And little effort is made to relate it to Byron's experience.

In sum, how "objective" can a biography be when it is as rigidly chronological as Professor Marchand makes it? when, in the midst of a love affair, the story halts because trivial detail and anecdote must be fitted into calendar place? The calendar effect results for one thing in a catalogue of lecheries, so that Byron is made to seem more of a heartless rake than he was. The difference between a dissolute woman-chaser and a man like Byron lies precisely in the fact that for the poet the qualities of love and passion transcend mere concupiscence. Marchand is surprised that certain readers of his manuscript taxed him with "not presenting a very favorable picture of Byron." He is quite right in feeling that his job was to be neither favorable nor unfavorable; yet his method does end by doing scantier justice to his subject, since action is often recorded without a search for motive, or inquiry into pattern of behavior.

OF the romantic movement, the broad background of Byron's life, the great ecstatic shudder of hope Byron generated in Europe, we get only hints; and although the biographer visited the scenes of his subject's life, no sense of scene is evoked for us, save where Byron himself does so in his letters. We are given a poet without his poetry, a creative being without his landscape. This is a pity, for the scholarship itself is on the whole exemplary.

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Japan's Most-Read Novelist

by Edward Seidensticker

WHETHER they know it or not, Messrs. Regenry have done something very revolutionary: they have published a Japanese novel with the author's name in the Japanese order, surname first, and they have outwitted all the cataloguers by giving not the slightest hint that they have done so.

Soseki, who was born in 1867 and died in 1916, is a major figure in modern Japanese literature. A student and for a time a professor of English literature, he early rebelled against the curious school of autobiographical writing that in Japan goes by the name "Naturalism." The Naturalists stand at the head of the main stream in contemporary Japanese letters, and Soseki is therefore something of a heretic. He is for all that the most widely read of authors. The fortunes of one very important publishing house are largely founded on profits from his collected works, and Japanese who otherwise make a great show of knowing nothing about their own literature ("All my training was in French") will almost always have read two or three of his early novels. His grave, in the Zoshigaya cemetery where his characters so often walk, is usually surrounded by reverent tourists. With proper introduction, one may go gaze at his brain, which is pickled in alcohol in the medical museum of Tokyo University. The attendant explains that it used to be more impressive, that these things have a way of shrinking over the years.

Kokoro, by Natsume Soseki, translated by Edwin McClellan (Regnery; $3.95).

What, then, is all the commotion about? His early and most widely read novels are, to me at least, bright but not extraordinary, so deliberate and slow-moving that one almost accepts the term "school of leisure" with which hostile critics attempted to dismiss them. The most important make up a loose trilogy describing the struggles of the individual to realize himself in the face of convention. No doubt it is of great importance that a concept akin to Christian individualism found so energetic and talented an advocate in collectivist Meiji Japan. But the Japanese often seem excessively indulgent toward "important" novels, and one cannot help feeling that the early Soseki is too extravagantly praised.

IT IS at the end of the trilogy, where most readers leave him, that Soseki really begins to seem interesting. His hero, having found himself as an individual, begins to suspect that his own individuality is ugly. He has made a foreign concept his own, in other words, and now he has a monster on his hands. The novels that follow are all attempts to find a way out of the dilemma, Soseki's own, and, in a way, the dilemma of modern Japan.

Soseki absorbed a foreign culture as thoroughly as any Japanese of his time; and, having done so, he found much in it that he hated. The heroes of his younger novels fight for individuality, the heroes of his later novels turn with loathing from their own egotism. Egotism (Soseki liked to use the English word untranslated) becomes the great evil, and the opposite good is represented by a word, untranslatable and not to be found in dictionaries, that seems to have in it something of Buddhist self-denial and something of Taoist quietism. We never learn how he would have his characters win through to this final consummation. His last and finest novel is unfinished. It is called *Light and Darkness*, and as it stands we have only the darkness, two massive egos fighting each other.

Kokoro is perhaps the blackest book in the whole series. It is the story of a lonely man overcome with feelings of guilt for having long ago betrayed his best friend, one "K." "I bear with my loneliness now," he says to a young student who has for mysterious reasons become attached to him, "in order to avoid greater loneliness in the years ahead. You see, loneliness is the price we have to pay for being born in this modern age, so full of freedom, independence, and our own egotistical selves." In the end, he concludes that he can overcome "his own egotistical self" only by extinguishing himself. He decides to commit suicide, and leaves behind a long letter describing his reasons to the student.

The novel is ingeniously contrived. The first half tells of relations between the student and the "Sensei" ("Master" or "Teacher"—we never learn his name) and relations between the student and his own family; and the last half is wholly taken up by the Sensei's "testament." We thus have tantalizing glimpses of an odd, embittered man. Then, suddenly, we are plunged into his past. At first it seems unfair that we should be deprived of the student's company, for he is a very engaging lad, addicted to "leaf whistling" and terribly serious about his duties as a warder off of burglars; but a moment's reflection shows that we leave him at precisely the point in his young career where we pick up the Sensei in his. Tragedies thus seem to stretch ahead in an unbroken chain, relentless as Karma itself.

And yet, for all its ingeniousness, there is something a little inadequate about the novel. The Sensei remains an

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

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annoyingly misty figure, and nowhere are we to feel what it is that draws the student to him. The bond between the two is never established, a fact that goes a long way toward making the first half of the novel meaningless. Why is the student so fascinated? Why should he feel that he will "be left in a world of total darkness" upon learning of the Sensei's death?

We never really know—though it might be pointed out in Soseki's justification that the darkness seems less "total" in the original than it does in Mr. McClellan's translation.

On the whole the translation is extremely good. Sometimes the conversation is awkward ("It doesn't look as if he expects to live another ten or twenty years, as you seem to think he did") and just occasionally a participle dangles. It is almost always fluent, however, frequently resourceful, and seldom freer than the occasion demands.

ART

Bohrod's Close View

AARON BOHROD'S present style of painting is so radically different from every sub-species of American painting since World War II that the difference itself requires comment before the two dozen paintings now at the Milch Galleries, New York, can be reasonably discussed. Difference has become an increasingly difficult quality to find. One can only sympathize with the graduating art student desperately searching for a new manner that will not be discovered simultaneously by one or a hundred of his peers engaged in the same search.

Essentially, I think, our recent painting has translated into paint something that Hollywood achieved in its own art from several decades earlier. The key to Hollywood production, at least up to the arrival of the wide screen, has been the concept of the movie personality, an exact reversal of the traditional relationship between actor and character. The personality, in the Hollywood sense, existed independently of any given role. As the art of the press agent was perfected it became possible for a personality to exist without any role at all. The individual movie becomes in that scheme simply one more expression of the personality which carries on an independent existence from movie to movie and in private life as publically presented.

Needless to say the pleasure sought by the customers of such movies has little to do with the delight proper to a story told cinematically. Aesthetic distance is totally eliminated and some kind of hyper-intimacy of indentification with the personality sought.

Action painting does the same thing. The mental image for example, of Jackson Pollock's manner of applying paint is much more durable than the mental image of any particular Pollock. The pleasure of looking at Pollock is also derived from a high degree of identification with the painter in the process of painting. You don't look at an object, as you do with virtually all painting executed more than ten years ago: rather, you live over again the act of painting. You partake of the excitement and even frenzy of the process itself. Again aesthetic distance has to be eliminated: if the process is allowed to become an object its highest rewards are those of decoration.

Bohrod's difference from all all this is radical. He makes objects. The objects he makes are still-life paintings done in



This Christmas give The New Republic

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Notes on Contributors

REUEL DENNEY'S newest book is *The Astonished Muse*, a study in American mass culture. LEON EDEL is the biographer of Henry James and a member of the English faculty of New York University. EDWARD SIEDENSTICKER, an American living in Tokyo, is active as a translator of modern Japanese literature.

minute sharp focus, with the act of painting once again an extremely sensitive and effective instrument, the mastery of which is placed at the service of some end beyond itself. Paradoxically while Bohrod is not above making a deliberate pursued so as to conceal itself, his success is so complete that the very non-existence of the process in the finished work calls attention to its skill, somewhat in the way, perhaps, that the dialogue of John O'Hara demands attention to the selective ear that overheard it.

But there is a great deal more to Bohrod than the astonishing skill that meets the eye and occasionally fools the eye. Bohrod's not above making a deliberate display of his skill—as in "The Women" in the show at the Milch. This unframed painting has its three dimensional frame painted on the surface. An antique sewing-machine is the principal object within the frame along with a Godey illustration, and some spools of thread. Pinned on to the frame are some old Valentine figures, a scrap of paper with a printed female eye, a safety pin and an old cigarette card of an actress. Hanging from the frame so that its volume appears to be half within the picture, half outside, is a darning egg. Finally, the supreme deception, a length of ribbon runs in and out of apparently picture space and apparently real space to the complete confusion of the viewer. While this is a dazzling performance, the picture succeeds beautifully in allowing the manner of painting, along with the selected symbols, to comment on the subject and, in particular, on the play between reality and illusion for which woman herself is a classical symbol.

"Onions and Rose" illustrates a group of contrasts that figures in many of Bohrod's still-lifes. The background is a weatherbeaten barn door, with red paint peeling to reveal green beneath, with random nailheads and the marks of use and decay. Hanging from one nail is a string of half a dozen Bermuda onions. The "rose" is in a scalloped edged Victorian Valentine fastened to the lower right. Beneath it is a scrap of newsprint containing, incidentally, Bohrod's name. To the left of the onions is a news photo of a girl, head bowed. The onions are in that ripe stage when several layers are peeling and new sprouts are growing. The play of light down their surface is beautifully done as is the shadow they cast on the already complex surface of the door. In the news photo the paper has been crumpled up and then smoothed out so that there are two distinct lights in its treatment, the photographer's light and the light of the entire picture cast over a now three dimensional surface. Again all this superb technique adds up to quietly poignant comment on or revelation of the human situation.

IT IS no more reasonable to translate Bohrod's work as a series of illustrations for the maxim, "All things pass" than it is to sum up *Macbeth* as "Crime doesn't pay." The rose in the painting noted has in fact endured and its enduring freshness is played against the door's decay, the sprinkled pinup and the onions ripe for death and resurrection. The passing of time goes on in these works but so does the ransoming from time.

Despite the more or less constant themes and variations, Bohrod's paintings show an apparently limitless variety. Each presents an entirely new world deliberately and effectively composed of objects which set up endless relationships with each other, with light, with textures, with form and with the experience of the degrees of permanence in a transitory existence.

AGRICULTURAL implements concern Bohrod with their implications of cyclic nature and the days and ways of a vanished rural America. Natural objects, stones, seed pods, butterflies, flowers, fruits, leaves, and all kinds of wood appear in that new vision which is one of the joys of looking at painting. Art is another great source of supply for the painter but always in the photograph or reproduction of the original object. There is a beautiful Botticelli portrait head as a detail in one of the pictures at Milch, but it is neither simply Botticelli nor Botticelli as seen by Bohrod; it is rather Botticelli by Harry Abrams.

I am quite sure that Bohrod got into this way of painting as a kind of extraordinary protest. He's been doing it for five years and the protest has been completely refined out, though every painting proves his point; that craft, taste, skill and objective vision can itself be of service to art.

FRANK GETLEIN

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RECORDS

Singers and Roles

LONDON'S *Goetterdaemerung* (XLLA-48) with Flagstad as Brünnhilde was an occasion for me to listen to the entire work for the first time in 20 years, and to discover that what I disliked 20 years ago—the dramatic ideas, the words and most of the vocal writing—I still dislike now, but to be reminded on the other hand of how marvelous some of the orchestral writing is.

The recording is derived from a broadcast in Oslo in 1956 with Scandinavian singers of whom Set Svanholm (Siegfried) and Waldemar Johnsen (Gunther) are disturbingly poor, but Egil Nordsjo (Hagen), Eva Gustavson (Waltraute) and Ingrid Bjoner (Gutrune) are adequate and satisfying, and Per Groenneberg (Alberich), with a fine baritone voice, is outstanding. A major strength of the performance is the excellent playing of the all-important orchestral part by the Oslo Philharmonic and Norwegian State Radio Orchestras under the direction of Oivin Fjeldstad, who paces and shapes the work effectively. And the other major strength is Flagstad. When she begins to sing, her voice in *Zu neuen Taten, teurer Helde* has the lustre I recall hearing when she first sang those words in the Metropolitan in 1935; but as she continues and the voice rises above its middle register it now loses the lustre that it retained all the way to the top in 1935. However, her manner of producing and using the voice concedes nothing to age; and her sixty-odd years make it even more exciting to hear the assured way the voice goes wherever it has to and, in its course, attacks and holds those lustreless but clear and powerful high notes.

This was what one heard in the French version of Gluck's *Alceste* at the Metropolitan in 1951—notably in the great aria *"Divinités du Styx,"* in which Flagstad's voice, deploying itself in a long phrase, rose to a breathtaking succession of secure and increasingly powerful high notes, and having done this once did it immediately a second time. Quite possibly she could not accomplish this feat six years later; and that may be why she recorded for London (XLLA-49) the earlier Italian version, in which the corresponding aria *"Ombre, larve"* doesn't have those taxing phrases. But even in what she is called on to do her singing in this performance is disappointing: whereas in the *Goetterdaemmerung* the upper range of the voice is lustreless but agreeable, in the *Alceste* it is unpleasantly edged, acidulous and occasionally strident. And the slow pacing by Geraint Jones makes the work ponderous and dull.

THE SUCCESSION of early to recent Callas recordings documents the deterioration in her voice caused by her reckless use of it; and in the most recent Angel recordings—of La Scala performances of Verdi's *Un Ballo in Maschera* (3557) and Bellini's *La Sonnambula* (3568)—the upper range is a wobbly yowl. But the lower range retains a loveliness that is made compelling by the unusual timbre; in addition the singing exercises at close microphone-range an expressive and dramatic compulsion which it did not at a distance in the Metropolitan; and the expressiveness is achieved with phrasing that is unfailing in its continuity of tension and feeling for musical shape. With her Amelia the *Ballo in Maschera* offers Gobbi's excellent Renato, but the annoyingly mannered singing of Di Stefano's Ricardo and the tremulously unfocussed tones of Barbieri's Ulrica. The orchestra under Votto is active and expressive in relation to the singing, but doesn't achieve the hair-raising power of the NBC Symphony under Toscanini; and Votto cannot hold the singers to tempo and phrase as Toscanini does. The Toscanini performance remains the one to acquire.

Not only does Callas do some lovely and affecting singing in the beautiful lyrical writing of *La Sonnambula*, but the recording is worth having for the way one of Bellini's most affecting melodies, Elvino's *"Tutto è sciolto,"* is sung by Nicola Monti, who produces similar ear-ravishing tone and flawless phrasing throughout. And there are in addition the excellent Lisa of Eugenia Ratti and Rodolfo of Nicola Zaccaria, the beautiful singing of the chorus, the playing of the fine orchestra under Votto.

LONDON'S *Barber of Seville* (XLLA-51) has a dazzling cast—Simionato as Rosina, Bastianini as Figaro, Corena as Bartolo, Siepi as Basilio. But Simionato and Corena exhibit less than their former ability to sing the florid writing accurately; Siepi is in rough voice; Bastianini is blatant; and worse than all this are the painful failures of Alvinio Misciano's attempts at florid singing in the role of Count Almaviva. Add the brutal cuts; and you have a recording to avoid.

In standard repertory one of the events of the year is Epic's *Marriage of Figaro* (SC-6022): Mozart's most marvelous opera, with Schoeffler and Jurinac superb as the Count and Countess, Streich an excellent Susanna, Christa Ludwig a good Cherubino, and the lesser parts sung well. A major weakness of the performance is Walter Berry's Figaro—the voice that is unvarying in its not very attractive color, the singing that is not enlivened by the phrasing. And Boehm's slow pacing robs much of the work of its animation; but on the other hand it enables the singers and the Vienna Symphony to execute their parts easily—one result being that the orchestra part which is one of the chief marvels of the work is heard behind and around the singing with a clarity I don't recall in any previous recorded performance. And at certain points Boehm's slow tempos and deliberateness are expressively effective: they give the Count's third-act aria tremendous power, and make the work's crowning sublimity, the *"Contessa, perdono"* passage at the end, overwhelming.

B. H. HAGGIN

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Correspondence

(Continued from page 3)

sional even for the $100,000 goals, has methods of separating a man from his dollar that makes the most avaricious Main Street merchant blush.

For example: "Don't accept cash. People give more on pledges." "Please take names of your neighbors and friends. They will have a harder time refusing or giving less than they ought to give."

The very idea of someone establishing an amount that I Ought To Give is sufficiently irritating to use as an excuse for not giving at all.

Two years ago the newspaper for which I work was obliged to condemn in an editorial the practice of certain fund raisers of circulating information about companies and individuals who, in the opinion of the fund raisers, had not supported their projects sufficiently. But it did no good for this year we were told that so-and-so only gave so-much.

However, the public reaction has been voiced. For the second year in a row, the United Community Fund lacks 25 percent of its goal, and its goal has been considerably trimmed down from last year.

LEONARD U. WILSON

Bennington, Vt.

► *Mencken and the Nazis*

SIRS:

IN A LETTER to you, Mr. Charles Angoff recalls that in an NBC broadcast last year he declared that H. L. Mencken never said "a really harsh word" against the Nazis. Mr. Angoff adds that he has never been "successfully contradicted."

I also participated in the broadcast to which Mr. Angoff refers, and at that time I quoted from a letter written by Mr. Mencken on May 25, 1933, in which he spoke of the "extraordinary imbecility" of the Nazis, said that it was "quite impossible to set up any rational defense of their course," accused them of "talking and acting in a completely lunatic manner," compared Hitler to "an Imperial Wizard of the Ku Klux Klan," and concluded that "his followers imitate, plainly with his connivance, the monkey-shines of the American Legion at its worst."

In another letter to Theodore Dreiser, Mencken wrote, "God knows what the Nazis are up to. They seem to be a gang of lunatics to me. I hear I am on their blacklist. . . . I don't know a single man among them, and all my friends in Germany seem to be in opposition—that is, all save a few damned fools who I'd hesitate to approach."

WILLIAM MANCHESTER

Middletown, Connecticut

The New Republic *welcomes communications from its readers in regard to subjects of current interest. Those of 300 words or less lend themselves to publication more readily than longer letters.*

► *Rediscount and Recession*

SIRS:

SUMNER SLICHTER may be right ("The Rediscount Rate and the Recession," *NR*, Nov. 25, 1957), but I think that he is somewhat too optimistic, because the recession in 1953-54 was preceded by much more healthful economic conditions than have pertained during the past few years. Consequently, I incline to the view that the deficiencies in consumer purchasing power and other maladjustments which have resulted in the current situation will not be counteracted as fully as Professor Slichter thinks by the change in Federal Reserve Board policies and by such slight increases in Federal spending as may occur.

It seems to me that unemployment may further increase quite substantially in 1958, and I do not yet see powerful expansionary forces coming into the picture by the spring of 1958.

LEON H. KEYSERLING

Washington, D. C.

► *Saving Space*

SIRS:

AS ONE of your very interested subscribers, may I offer a suggestion?

Eliminate the large type detailing, on the cover, the contents of each issue. In your issue of Nov. 4, 1957, for example, I would have been pleased to find Sagittarius (or even, Saroyan On Himself, or the start of Correspondence) on your cover—with that much more inside space devoted to other subjects.

C. A. YOUNG

Coronado, Calif.

The editors would like to know how many readers share Mr. Young's view.

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

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